DOCUMENT 1

 

«MEDITERRANEAN COOPERATION»

 

Welcoming adress

Introduction to cooperation in the Mediterranean region

1. «Sustainable development»: the meeting point between cooperation development and the environment

2. The role of NGOs in the international context

3. Specific characteristics of cooperation development in the Mediterranean region

A. Relative proximity of the participants: the geographical context

1. The Mediterranean as a unit: the ecoregion (ecology)

2. The Mediterranean as a North-South border: inequality (economy)

3. Migration and population growth (demographics)

B. One participant (to the North) is the European Union: the political context

4. The EuroMediterranean Partnership

5. The Mediterranean Free Trade Zone (MFTZ)

C. A rough sea

6. Cultural diversity

7. Armed Conflicts

4. The NGO Programme for «Mediterranean Cooperation»

Bibliography

 

Presentation of the MED Forun «Mediterranean Cooperation» Programme

1. Introduction

2. The information service: MED Info

3. Projects Bank

A. Different levels of service and participation

B. How are projects developed?

C. The verification list

D. Examples in action

4. Building the concept of «Mediterranean Cooperation»

Bibliography

 

WELCOMING ADDRESS

First of all I would like to welcome to all attendants at the Vth Mediteranean Environmental Forum (Barcelona Novembre 19 and 20 1998) and to thank everybody and introduction of the speaker, Javier Cisneros, the coordinator of MED Forum cooperation projects (slide 1).

One of the two aims of this Vth Mediterranean Environmental Forum is to lay the foundations for the «Mediterranean Cooperation» programme to spur sustainable co-development of the Mediterranean basin as a whole. In other words, to define the work to be carried out out by the NGOs responsible for stimulating sustainable development in the special case of the region around the Mediterranean sea. This morning's sessions are dedicated to this subject.

As shown in the time-table, we open with a short introduction to our understanding of the term «mediterranean cooperation» and then proceed to sketch out the points required to put into action a policy with such a wide range as cooperation development when it covers specifically the Mediterranean region.

Then, we continue with the presentation and launching of the «Mediterranean Cooperation» programme developed by MED Forum, the network made up of Mediterranean NGOs for ecology and sustainable development, which organised this Vth Environmental Forum on the Mediterranean. On the one hand, the programme is intended to provide a service to all the Mediterranean NGOs by facilitating the implementation of cooperation development projects, on the other hand it creates a meeting point for all those who make the Mediterranean cooperation projects possible, the participants such as NGOs, all levels of government, international bodies, all possible types of donors, experts and technical staff, associates and volunteers.

Lastly and most importantly, we are honoured to include among those present at our conference table a broad spectrum of people who are all involved in one way or another with the Mediterranean region and its realities. Their varying outlooks, experiences and ranges of knowledge will help us to design the role which the NGOs will perform in the improvement of the region. The conference will be in two parts. The first part will consist of short contributions from our guest speakers, while the second part will be open to all comers. We would like to thank our guests for their presence here and for their kindness in conforming with our requests. We are also honoured to be able to benefit from their opinions here today. (Slide 2).

 

 

INTRODUCTION TO COOPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION

 

1. «Sustainable development»: the meeting point between cooperation development and the environment

The first question we ask ourselves is this: Why should we talk of cooperation at an Environmental Forum on the Mediterranean? Or: Why should we NGOs in the sphere of ecology find ourselves today discussing cooperation? The answer is very simple. The grand aim of planetary ecology is to provide «sustainable development» for mankind. The key to this is contained within the concept of sustainable development.

«Sustainable development» as a concept implies the need for development to «provide current necessities without jeopardising the capacity of future generations to provide their own» (WCED 1987). This provides a meeting point for two philosophies with different origins: That of the defense of the integrity of planetary ecology and that of the people working to improve the quality of life in underdeveloped societies.

Historically, these two philosophies have followed different pathways (slide 3) and we can consider that their meeting point in an international context was at the UNCED, the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) in 1992. This World Summit Meeting in Rio implied that the two concepts giving name to the Conference: Environment and Development shared common ground, with the concept of «sustainable development» providing a definitive link between matters of importance to ecology and those of the North-South divide.

We can find several milestones on the road to this convergence which was completed at the World summit Meeting in Rio:

- 1966. The UN set up the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) because of pressure from the underdeveloped nations —then known, because of political block logic, either as non-aligned nations or as the Third World— to restructure the international economy.

- 1972. The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) in Stockholm set up the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP): which was purely environmental.

- 1980. The Brandt Report aroused the world to understanding of the complex web of interdependence between the Northern and Southern nations —the term «Third World», coming from the East-West divide, was dropped— and it was proposed that terms such as «aid» and «assistance» also be dropped in favour of the creation of a new structure of the international economy.

- 1978. The Brundtland Report, Our Common Future was produced by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCDE) which was set up by the UNEP in 1983 under the leadership of the Norwegian Prime Minister. Although previously introduced by the IUCN, the term «sustainable development» was used here as a definite concept: «Sustainable development insists that basic necessities be available to everyone and that everyone has the opportunity to work for a better life» (WCED 1987).

-[In 1989 the FAO Report attempted to integrate environmental with developmental matters: Conference on Agriculture and the Environment (Holland, 1991).]

- 1992. Finally, as a result of the Brundtland Report, the United Nations Conference on Ecology and Development (UNCED) was held in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil). The concept of sustainable development was accepted universally.

But how do we define sustainable development, a term with so many meanings?

- Even the term «development» is an unspecific concept, which is why everybody presumes that it is something desirable. Furthermore, it tended to be equated with economic growth, although this reductionist viewpoint is now outmoded. In the 1970s and 1980s there were a lot of theories on development and on the models to be followed by underdeveloped countries in order to escape from their vulnerable positions. In almost all cases these models bore no viable relationship with the unrepeatable historical processes which had shaped those countries now thought of as developed. Faced with globalisation and progressive derestriction of international trade, the debate still continues.

- The term «sustainable» has also provided cause for debate. In fact, at the outset many Southern countries criticised the North for trying to classify the form of development they followed as unsustainable and assumed that this might be some form of trap leading to indefinite postponement of development.

Getting away from theoretical discussions on the meaning of «development» (whether purely economic growth or including structural changes and, if so, of what type) NGODs (Non-Governmental Organisations for Development) clearly defined the overriding aim of cooperation development: the eradication of poverty. Both Commitment 20:20 of the Social Development Summit (Copenhagen, 1995) and the document stating the objectives of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 1996) demonstrate this clearly.

With regard to sustainability, the meaning used by NGOs dedicated to environmental issues is also much clearer: «the improvement of the quality of human life within the loading capacity of the ecosystem which supports that life» (IUCN-UNEP-WWF, 1991).

The merging of environmental and development issues, enshrined in the concept «sustainable development», had already been put into practice by the NGOs in their own particular spheres, whether the organisational background came from dealing with cooperation or with environmental problems. Experience in the field shown that true development cannot take place unless it is sustainable and that it is impossible to defend the environment unless the well-being of the people of the area is included. Thus, environmental and ecological questions have gradually broadened to include the North-South problems, while cooperation in development has demonstrated that it is impossible to promote development in the South unless the type of development takes into account the environmental necessities of the planet in the future. Universal acceptance of the term «sustainable development» only goes to show that our work has been on the right tracks.

Nevertheless, the merger of development and environment has not yet been reflected by similar linkages within the institutions —international organisations, governments, local authorities, etc.— working in these areas, and their budgets and policies. In the best case they may try to discover the possible environmental impact of development projects (EIA: Environmental Impact Assessment) or attempt to provide a positive economic effect in environmental projects.

Conclusion: Development and environmental issues have merged at two levels:

- The theoretical level, shown by universal acceptance of the need for «sustainable development».

- The practical level, shown by the coincident aims of projects carried out by developmental NGOS and environmental NGOs in the field.

Cooperation in the Mediterranean can only be considered from the viewpoint provided by this merger.

We are also present at the merging of a third party into our sphere of international cooperation. Alongside «developmental» NGOs and «environmental» NGOs, we now see the NGOs for the «defence of human rights» (freedom, peace, democracy, minorities, women's and children's rights). There can be no true development without individual autonomy. Neither the «sustainable development» defined in Rio nor the Human Development Index (HDI) defined by the PNUD, have begun to take into account this other developmental factor. Here, also, the NGOs work together in practice, all we are missing is the theoretical concept to describe the practical experience.

 

2. The role of NGOs in the international context

Having tried to explain why the environment and development have become fully united, let us see what sort of challenges this union brings to cooperation development in general and to Mediterranean cooperation in particular.

Context (slide 4): Cooperation development is being put into practice within a framework which define the end of this century:

- World-wide standardisation of market laws. On the one hand, the end of «real» socialism has put a stop to the bipolar structure of international relationships and on the other hand, this has allowed the economy to be globalised with market laws now covering the planet as a whole. This triumph for the market and its laws was neither automatic nor spontaneous, rather it resulted from what could be called la pensée unique or, for those considering this term controversial, from the defence of neoliberal ideas.

- Persistence of poverty. Despite those announcing an imminent «end of the story» thanks to the globalisation of market, democracy and well-being, the divide between rich and poor is still broadening. The pockets of poverty in the Southern hemisphere and in the Southern part of the Northern hemisphere, do not just persist; they are growing.

- Loss of governments' leadership. Both, governments and the international intergovernmental organisms which these governments make up, are loosing their role as leaders of economic development. Their role is now played by private capital and transnational companies. This continually weakens the democratic control which society can exert on the factors influencing its development.

- Consolidation of NGOs as active agents in international society. The novelty of the NGOs bursting onto the international scene some years ago has been converted into a solid and indispensable presence. Especially in the North, we have been a part of a real «boom» of groups of citizens concerned about playing an active part in society and confronting its problems, all types of associations, NGOs, voluntary organisations, etc.

The standardisation of global economy is, in itself, unlikely to be able to eradicate poverty or to promote sustainable development. An opposite effect is more probable. The NGOs must continue working for this outcome, now more than ever, perhaps.

The challenges facing the NGOs are (slide 5):

- Development of a true partnership of equals between North and South, replacing the patronage and direction of the investors so as to give power to those who should be the authors of their own development.

- Capacity building of the Northern and Southern NGOs. Professionalism, sharing of experience, networking, etc.

- Breaking away from the limits of pure field work to affect the international mechanisms causing the poverty. Influencing of the national and international policies of development.

- Promotion of a worldwide ethical system: «The current trend is to create systems defined by a Southern author as "multinational coalitions formed by people who believe in social justice, equality and democracy in order to influence the development process". Of course, these coalitions are formed by groups involved in causes ranging from human rights to environmental development and on a scale from national to international. They are building a new society for change» (Intermón, 1997).

This is what is happening to NGOs and world cooperation, but what about the Mediterranean?

- We are convinced that cooperation development in the Mediterranean region has its own unique and specific properties, making it necessary for the general idea of cooperation development to be redefined for the situation.

- Our intention is to create a theoretical concept: «mediterranean cooperation». A term, a common ground, a label that when used, automatically makes everyone understand that the concept referred to is that of the specific type of cooperation development needed to deal with the peculiarities of the Mediterranean region.

 

3. Specific characteristics of cooperation development in the Mediterranean region

Let us look at the characteristics unique to Mediterranean cooperation. At first glance three aspects are impossible to miss (slide 6):

A. The relative proximity of the participants: North and South are in contact, they are geographical neighbours and are distributed along the shores of the Mediterranean.

B. The European Union is one of these participants: the sea is dominated to the North by the presence of a great empire that differs from all previous models, but is still rich and powerful.

C. A rough sea: the Mediterranean is not a peaceful sea; the contrasts and differences between nations and cultures which share its shores provoke tensions which can sometimes result in armed conflict.

 

A. Relative proximity of the participants: the geographical context

One of the most specific elements of Mediterranean cooperation for development, which does not exist in most other cases, is the geographical proximity of the participants in the process (slide 7).

The idea of North-South cooperation for development is in the process of evolving from the traditional concept of a one-way flow from a developed country to a developing country of financial technical and human resources which favour the self-development of the recipient, to a broader concept of «codevelopment» where the dividing line between donor and beneficiary is less clear.

Even so, however, there are always at least two participants or poles: one from a developed and the other from a developing country. This continues to be North-South cooperation even if the benefits are mutual.

In the case of the Mediterranean region, the participants belong to the same geographical unit. They are close to each other. They are neighbours. For example, there is not the same that a Danish NGO provides a microcredit service to Guatemala or a Spanish NGO sinks wells in India, than an Italian NGO promotes a cooperative farming scheme among the unemployed youth of Albania.

 

Conclusion: The geographical factor causes Mediterranean cooperation to show a series of characteristics unseen elsewhere, a series of consequences analyzed here.

1. The Mediterranean as a unit: the ecoregion (ecology)

Nowadays, the identity of the Mediterranean as a regional unit or sub-system in the context of international relationships is being called into question. It is not thought to form a whole, whether politically, economically or, even, historico-culturally. The usual reasons given is the region's enormous differences between:

- economies,

- cultures and religions and

- politics, divided between democracies and authoritarian systems.

It is obvious that the Mediterranean does not act as one homogeneous unit either politically or in the global economy. It seems that it does not have any interest in functioning as a political unit or as an economic block.

Furthermore, it does not even exist as a theoretical unit either in the manuals of economic or political geography or in the majority of international organisations and multilateral agencies (exceptions being: the MAP of UNEP, the METAP of WB and EIB and the EuroMediterranean Partnership of the EU). In 1992 Paul Balta (Balta 1992) was already denouncing the thorough destructuring of the Mediterranean as a whole. This is why strange contradictions occur, such as that which makes the European Union leave Croatia out of consideration as a Mediterranean country —it is excluded from the EuroMediterranean Partnership— and on the contrary consider it as a CEE (Central or Eastern European) country.

In fact, we who believe in a deep cultural unity among the Mediterranean peoples and a form of understanding of life found everywhere from Algeciras to Istanbul which gives a authentic and common philosophy of life, are even accused of being historico-cultural romantics. Our opponents bring up the obvious diversity in religion, language and level of civilisation which separate us as demonstrated by the bewildering variety of external phenomena, such as religious architecture and modes of dress and in more basic phenomena such as the social position of women.

It is only from the geostrategic viewpoint that the Mediterranean is seen as a unit: as the field of operations for the USA's 6th fleet. That is to say, it is seen as a key area for the supply and transport of hydrocarbons to the West.

However, there is another point of view, besides the geostrategic one, which definitely sees the Mediterranean as one unit: the environmental point of view. Our hydrographical basins drain into the same sea, we enjoy similar climates and our landscapes are the most «civilised» in the world because of the millennia of activity of humankind to which they have been subjected. The environmental problems and challenges are common to all the countries in the region and those of any one area, as in all ecosystems, affect the totality. This is the undeniable Mediterranean unit, the ecological one.

[We will leave to one side the problem of the precise geographical limits of the Mediterranean system, but we will follow the general practice of excluding the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea.]

Everyone here today knows about the great environmental challenges presented by the Mediterranean and we talked of these yesterday during the sessions on our MED Forum 2000Agenda: integrated management of water, of wastes and of coastal zones (IMCZ) and the struggle against desertification, protection of biodiversity, sustainable tourism, etc. Everyone here is a representative of one part or other of the Mediterranean, because we all know that these problems are shared by us all. We are the obvious proof that the Mediterranean is one unit.

This leads us to the importance of environmentally active NGOs in structuring the Mediterranean as one common unit. Since the problems are common and interrelated, the effort put into arriving at a solution in one area becomes the experience which can be applied in another.

 

Conclusion: The Mediterranean unquestionably makes up a single unit from the environmental point of view; it is an eco-region. What consequences does this cause for cooperation development among the countries of the basin? Any action within the sphere of cooperation development in the Mediterranean does:

- have effects on the unit as a whole and on the participants from each pole that are much greater than a similar action carried out at «long distance»,

- make it obviously necessary that codevelopment supersedes the unidirectional concept of assistance which still persists where the participants do not belong to the same geographical region, and

- makes the concepts of sustainability and environmental impact much more present realities, because the participants both share and understand the same eco-regional reality.

 

2. The Mediterranean as a North-South border: inequality (economy)

The disgraceful disparity in economy and human development in the world is the reason that cooperation development exists.

Thus we cannot consider this disparity a specific differential trait of Mediterranean cooperation set up between poles separated by an unfair division of riches.

The characteristic derived from geographical proximity is the fact that these poles are in intimate contact and have the close relationship of neighbours. Along the coasts of the same sea, the north and south in economic terms very nearly coincide with the geographical north and south.

Even so, the Mediterranean does not have countries included under the definitions of the least favoured, least developed or least advanced (LAC), on the GNP per capita scale. Nor are there any countries with a low «Human Development Index» (IDH below 0.500), although there are countries with a medium index (between 0.500 and 0.799) according to the UNDP classification (report 1997).

Some data on the economic differences:

- The ratio of average income in Mediterranean countries who are members of and those who are outside the EU is 1 to 20.

- The «Latin Arch» (Spain France and Italy) accounts for 88% of the GDP of the Mediterranean despite containing only 42% of its population.

- Mediterranean Europe consumes 80% of the total power used around the Mediterranean (9% of the world total).

But there is also a high degree of interdependence:

- The south is commercially dependent: the EU receives 40% of the total export of the arab countries in the zone (in the case of Tunis: 79%), but this only represents about 4% of the EU's trade with the exterior.

- The north is energy dependent: the non-EU members of the Mediterranean zone provide 20% of the energy consumed in the EU (the «Latin Arch» uses an even higher percentage).

The other similar North-South neighbourship situation which can be brought to mind is that between the USA and Mexico, where the Rio Grande divides the rich and Opulent north from the poverty of the South.

When north-south cooperation occurs between close and interdependent neighbours, as is the case in the Mediterranean and with USA-Mexico, it often loses its disinterested solidarity. The motivation for this cooperation is the north's desire that its quality of life not be threatened, rather than a desire to provide a better quality of life for the southern population. The northern inertia caused by living in golden isolation is broken by the need to do something in response to what it sees as a threat.

Because of this, planning should not be disinterested, but instead seek financial advantages for the north.

- Investing in the south to take advantage of the relative cheapness of labour (without going to the extreme of social dumping, or unfair advantage, because the workers protection does not exist or costs very little).

- Progressively liberalise mutual access to markets, although the main beneficiary of this is usually the north.

- Create employment in the south to prevent emigration to the north.

 

3. Migration and population growth (demographics)

In the Mediterranean zone there is a strong trend towards migration from the south to the north, mainly because of the economic disparity and the geographical proximity. But there are also other contributory factors:

- The overwhelming difference between fertility and population growth rates of southern and northern countries.

- The ageing of the north (with an inverted population pyramid) in comparison with the youth of the south.

- The impossibility of the south fulfilling the demand for work from its population, causing unemployment and loss of rural population.

- The unjust division of wealth in the south aggravated by policies of structural adjustment which favour social splitting.

Due to the first two factors given above, in the years to come the demographic superiority of the North will need to be invested in the active population of the south. For this reason, Sami Naïr does not talk of migratory flow, but of the «interdependency, of structural [population] interaction processes between the two shores of the Mediterranean» (Naïr 1998a).

More than 6 million people from non EU Mediterranean countries now live within the EU states. 50% come from Turkey, 22% from Morocco and 12% from Algeria. Their preferred destinations are Germany (43%) and France (32%). Only 38% choose another Mediterranean country (including France). [It would also be possible to include the 2 million French North Africans who are naturalised in France.]

How does this affect cooperation?

In the Mediterranean, the impulse towards cooperation or the worry about events in the south is set in motion on considering the immigration from there as a threat. One of the basic tasks of the NGOs involved in sustainable development is to reverse this trend of thought.

Emigration to the North is one of the most important factors of cooperation development in the broadest sense. If we overcome the traditional idea of cooperation being a flow of «assistance» from north to south, we can show that emigration provides one of the largest impulses towards development, as well as generating wealth in the receiving country «the financial and mercantile transfers of immigration to the southern countries outdo those of bilateral and multilateral aid by a long way. In fact, these transfers allow immigration to contribute as much to development in the country of origin as to labour in the receiving country. It is the quintessence of codevelopment (Naïr 1998). Immigration should thus be seen as a development tool instead of a threat.

Cooperation can also use this flow as a lever for development in countries of origin. The great aim of many northern NGOs is to integrate immigrants into the projects carried out in their countries of origin.

However the EU has made immigration a crime. 20,000 people a year land clandestinely on the coasts of Spain from the south: about half are detained. Schengen's Europe is also «fortress Europe»: The Europe of the sans papiers.

Conclusion: in a context of increasing migratory flow, as is the case in the Mediterranean, cooperation cannot be motivated by the protectionist interests of the north, but rather by a broad vision of the structural interdependence of the populations on both coasts who think of cooperation development as true codevelopment, fair sustainable and of mutual benefit.

 

B. One participant (to the North) is the European Union: the political context

The second characteristic trait of the Mediterranean is the presence of the European Union giant (slide 8).

The characteristics of the European Union are:

- It forms an already consolidated economic block: monetary union.

- It is on the point of deciding whether to form a true political unit.

- It is one of the richest zones of the planet.

- It has arisen from a unique historical experience: a supranational construction arising by the will of the member states.

- It is a community which, although it contains Mediterranean countries and is on the verge of expanding to the East, is led and guided by the central and northern European states.

The motives behind the desire of the community to cooperate with the south, in this case its south near and therefore threatening, are interested, but in no way altruistic motives:

a) preventative: a feeling of a threat to the security of «fortress Europe». The south could threaten the quality of life achieved in the North by:

- migration, as mentioned above,

- dependence on energy sources,

- lack of peace and social stability in the south and

- the degradation of the shared environment caused by the economic growth in the south.

b) prospective: construction of a large region capable of competing an a world with a trend towards economic tripolarity.

Even so, in this context two important steps have been taken towards opening the European Union to the rest of the Mediterranean:

1. The EuroMediterranean Partnership.

2. The setting up of a future Mediterranean Free Trade Zone (MFTZ).

But let us not forget that the Mediterranean is one thing —even if we cannot define exactly where it starts and ends— while another is the association or collaboration between the EU — currently made up of 15 countries of which only 4 are Mediterranean— with other Mediterranean countries— and not all of them. [Some of the countries excluded from the deal, such as Slovenia and Croatia, may become EU members, but what about Libya and Albania?] Associations with this set-up would have difficulty in seeing the Mediterranean as an aim or a priority.

 

4. The EuroMediterranean Partnership

The EuroMediterranean Conference held in Barcelona in November 1995 was a milestone in the European Union policy towards the Mediterranean. It meant the institution of an EU external policy towards the Mediterranean also based on other antecedents:

- The initial impulse came from the «Global Mediterranean Policy» set up in 1972 by France under Pompidou, in the face of the entrance of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark into the EEC. However, rather than following Lomé's lead in dealing with the ex-colonies of the ACP countries (Africa-Caribbean-Pacific) group by group —regional multilateralism— the EU treated with each country separately —bimultilateralism—.

- In the 1990s, on the one hand, the bipolar system eroded after the fall of the Berlin Wall allowed Germany to open to the East and caused France to seek a new balance by directing its interests towards the Mediterranean; on the other hand the southern Mediterranean situation deteriorated with the Gulf War (1990-91) and the conflicts in Algeria. This caused the Latin countries —which already included Spain— to coincide with those of the European Commission, presided over by Jacques Delors, in the need to update the community policy towards the Mediterranean. The result was the «Revised Mediterranean Policy» of 1992 which attempted to convert the former cooperation into a true partnership and broaden the scope from purely economic questions to include problems of global security.

Thus, we can say that the community policy towards the Mediterranean is:

- Overdue: we had to wait 15 years after the creation of the EEC in 1957 for the first policies to be formulated in 1972.

- Misconceived: based more on factors pertaining to the internal balance of the EU and unconcerned with the Mediterranean than on any true interest in the Mediterranean on the part of the European Union.

The EuroMediterranean Conference, held in Barcelona during the Spanish Presidency of the EU, caused some changes to these earlier policies. For the first time ever in history, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of 15 EU and 12 non-EU Mediterranean countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey) were all present. The meeting was also symbolic because Syria, the Lebanon and Israel were sitting at the same table, which had not occurred since the 1991 Madrid Conference. The guest list did not include Libya, Albania or the ex-Yugoslav republics. The EU was worried about European security in the global sense and interested in political and economic stability in the area and therefore set up the EuroMediterranean Partnership as a symmetrical process in parallel with its policy towards Eastern Europe, in the hope that this would result in the development of a strong commercial block.

The Barcelona Declaration classifies the agreements of the EuroMediterranean Conference under three headings or «baskets»:

- Political and security cooperation: definition of a common area of peace and stability.

- Financial and economic cooperation: creation of a common zone of prosperity.

- Social, cultural and human cooperation: development of human resources, promotion of intercultural understanding and of interchange among civil societies.

The novelty of the EuroMediterranean Conference was that civil society participated in the process: immediately after the Conference, the Euromed Civil Forum (coordinated by the Catalan Mediterranean Institute) gathered together more than 1.000 representatives of social, economic and cultural organisations with the intention of filling in the details of the political agreements reached at the Conference.

The financial instrument created by the European Union is the universally known MEDA.

However the EuroMediterranean Partnership is unsuccessful because of:

- The effects of the arab-israeli conflict.

- Shifting of EU interest towards the countries of the CEE and NIS (Central and Eastern Europe and Newly Independent States).

- Counter-interests on the part of the USA and the EU towards globalisation in general and the Mediterranean in particular.

This was proven at the Second EuroMediterranean Conference in Malta (May 1997) where the Charter for Security and Stability in the Mediterranean went unapproved.

Conclusion: We could ask ourselves today whether there is a clear political interest on the part of the EU and its member states to work in four of the Mediterranean or whether the Partnership was just a temporary success for the Spanish Presidency of the EU.

5. The Mediterranean Free Trade Zone (MFTZ)

The EuroMediterranean Conference of Barcelona and its Declaration (1995) made plans to set up in 2010 a Mediterranean Free Trade Zone between the EU and the 12 members of the Partnership as a final result of the bilateral agreements which were to be set in motion. This multibilateralism points the difference from other EU agreements like the Lomé treaties with the ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) countries which are based on regional multilateralism.

Special relationships already existed with Turkey —which at that time accepted the EU common external tariff—, with Cyprus and Malta —who were then negotiating for entry—. New agreements were signed, some negotiated before the Conference —Tunisia (July 1997) and Israel (November 1997)— and others negotiated afterwards —Morocco (February 1996) the Palestine National Authority (February 1997) and Jordan)—. Agreements with Egypt, the Lebanon, Algeria and Syria should soon follow.

The aim is to create a «zone of shared prosperity» by progressively suppressing import restrictions whether by tariff or of other types and increasing the export of specific products and services which give a comparative advantage. But there are still many barriers to remove:

- the economic differences between the EU and the other members,

- agricultural protectionism within the EU,

- the exterior debt,

- the «privileged» bilateral relationship between some EU member states and other states outside the community.

Putting their faith into the creation of the MFTZ shows the obvious political desire of the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries to open themselves to the globalisation of the economy and, therefore, take up the challenge of market competition with all its consequences.

As mentioned elsewhere, the other available experience of creating a free trade zone between northern and southern countries is the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Canada, the USA and Mexico which created NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Area).

The creation of the MFTZ «could have a serious impact on the physical and economic development of the Zone, its ecosystems and its natural resources» (Bromberg 1998) (slide 9). If the creation of this free trade zone is successfully completed the southern and eastern Mediterranean are expected to show economic growth, which could have a pernicious effect on the «sustainable development» of the basin:

- Industrial development will have a negative impact on the ecosystems with an increase in contaminating sectors: can this be absorbed?

- The quantity of wastes will increase: does the south have the treatment capacity to manage them?

(Putting these two together: will the south receive sufficient financial and technological resources to reach the environmental standards which will be set to harmonise the laws in the free trade zone?)

- Danger of ecological dumping (pollution havens): there will be a temptation to tone down the legislation on environmental standards to favour the relocation of northern industries to the south and to attract outside investment and/or to direct export to countries less demanding than the EU.

- Even more of the economic activity based in coastal zones.

But the economic growth will also bring a series of advantages:

- Improvement in the quality of life (which will cause a raising of the level of environmental consciousness).

- Increase in foreign investments.

- Transfer of environmental technologies.

- Strengthening of the legal environmental standards (because of bringing them into line with the legislation in the north).

 

Solutions:

1. Right from the start environmental themes must be explicitly incorporated into the design and put into practice in all negotiations directed towards the creation of a free trade zone. Furthermore, environmental questions must be an integral part of the documentation related to the free trade agreements, rather than forming a secondary or accessory dimension which often ended up as a dead end road, as occurred in the past with other experiences of free trade areas (NAFTA).

2. Environmental legislation must, despite the difficulties of dealing with so many countries, be harmonised throughout and not be converted into disguised protectionism.

3. Policies and strategies of development must clearly elect sustainability and ignore the traditional development models.

4. The NGOs must have the fundamental role of monitoring the process, as well as taking part. This makes it necessary, however, for the legislation and the political will of the governments of many countries support this role for the NGOs:

1. To facilitate and guarantee access to information for the NGOs and civil organisations.

2. Encourage external monitoring to be carried out by the NGOs of developmental and environmental policies and projects.

3. Promote NGO participation in the drafting of the policies and projects.

4. Promote joint implementation of the projects: by financing NGO projects or by employing NGOs to carry them out.

The creation of a Mediterranean Free Trade Zone is a milestone in the path to true codevelopment. It will be a unique experience in the sphere of north-south cooperation, because the economic disparity between the Mediterranean north and south is much greater than that between Mexico and its northern neighbours. Whether the MFTZ succeeds or fails will have consequences outside the Mediterranean region.

C. A rough sea

So far we have emphasised those factors giving the Mediterranean unity and coherence and those actions which are intended to promote its function as an entity, however the Mediterranean is obviously also a sea of contrasts, confrontations and conflicts. It is not peaceful sea.

History repeats itself: The Mediterranean sea is the cradle of many civilisations and the melting pot for many cultures. This means that over the centuries it has witnessed a large number of conflicts and confrontations, but it has also been the ideal setting for trade and interchange (slide 10).

6. Cultural diversity

The Mediterranean is the point where the East touches the rest. As well as being the place where the planetary economies of North and South are in contact, it is a meeting point for Eastern and Western cultures. Since the end of the Cold War, this no longer means a division into capitalist and soviet blocks —which in any case were centred on the «iron curtain»— but rather into Eastern and other cultures. It is the meeting point between what Professor Samuel Huntington so unfortunately phrased as «The West and the Rest» (Huntington 1993). The Mediterranean sea borders countries whose stereotypical western civilisations were the fruit of two revolutions, the French and the Industrial, while the other shore borders civilisations with different origins.

In the last few years political scientists such as Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington have emphasised the planetary divisions between civilisations. Huntington himself divides the world into 8 civilisations, defines their borders and states that any future world wars which may be produced will occur in areas such as our sea, where bordering civilisations come into conflict. Leaving aside the arbitrary form of his divisions and his simplistic exposition, the theories of Huntington and other such authors do not disguise their being an ad hoc justification of the foreign policies of the United States. The preeminent power on this planet keeps on looking for theories to justify its actions outside its own sphere, but until one turns up is quite willing to «satanise» its enemies through the media or from the universities.

We do not share Huntington's thesis. We are not trying to deny there are different civilisations on the Mediterranean coasts nor their involvement in several armed conflicts in the basin. However, if there is anywhere on the planet that intercultural dialogue can be established, it is the Mediterranean. We are the offspring of warriors and invaders, but also of traders and philosophers. Millennia of rubbing shoulders around the same sea has caused confrontations and wars but also commercial and cultural interchange. It is true that different cultures share the Mediterranean and that their relationships are not always harmonious, as shown throughout our common history, but the Mediterranean has also shown the most important examples of respect and peaceful coexistence. The NGOs who are gathered here today are the proof this: leaving behind or to one side the conflicts which our countries or our governments may face, we show the desire and the ability of the civil societies of the Mediterranean not just to understand each other but to work together.

I feel myself to be Mediterranean and I know that I am a westerner, but I feel much more able than most westerners —particularly those from further north or those who think like Professor Huntington— to accept and respect the fact that other human groups may wish to express themselves politically and socially in forms outside those laid down by the west, without this meaning that they are wrong or backward or feeling that this could become a threat to my «westernness». At risk of being thought romantic, I firmly believe in the existence of a patrimony, a shared cultural heritage that means the Mediterranean is not just a climate, a type of landscape and a type of cuisine, but also a way of looking at life.

From my point of view this «Mediterraneanness» is a tool that can be used to face up to the challenge of building peaceful coexistence among all the peoples around our sea. The world needs a win in this match.

(If it is necessary for me to choose between being a belligerent ethnocentric westerner and an pacific intercultural Mediterranean, I would stay with the latter and «renounce» my western identity.)

Unfortunately one thing that is present in the Mediterranean is a division among types of government: nobody can deny the existence of non-democratic regimes; authoritarian regimes, with little respect for human rights, lacking in political rights, with no respect for their citizens and their basic organisations, etc.

 

Conclusion: the cultural differences in the Mediterranean are a reality, but we must not be allow ourselves to be duped by the political use made of these differences if we are to carry through to real cooperation development.

 

 7. Armed conflicts

Cooperation development is often carried out in zones of conflict. The threat of future conflict or the aftermath of past conflict are often the setting for many projects. Another factor is that north-south cooperation is often shadowed by memories of colonisation and the continuing resistance of ex-colonies to cooperate with ex-colonisers.

So, what is special about cooperation in the Mediterranean being conducted in many cases in an area of manifest or latent conflict? Only the type and origin of these conflicts.

According to the expert Paul Balta (Balta 1997), Mediterranean conflicts can be classified in two groups: those inherited from the far past and those pertaining to the situation existing in the second half of the twentieth century (slide 11).

The conflicts inherited from the past have their origin in the Mediterranean being the cradle for the three revealed monotheistic religions. They are:

1. The Arab-Israeli conflict.

2. The confrontations in former Yugoslavia: orthodox Serbs, catholic Croatians and muslim Bosnians.

3. Ethnic-religious conflicts:

- Confrontations between the Greeks and the Turks in Cyprus.

-The Armenian question.

Other conflicts have a more recent origin, the second half of this century:

4. Territorial border conflicts arising from decolonisation:

- North Africa: Algeria-Tunisia, Algeria-Morocco, etc.

- Western Sahara.

- Egypt-Sudan.

- Syria over Alexandretta (Iskenderun) and the Lebanon.

- Palestine.

5. Conflicts between communities supported by different regional powers: The Lebanon is the emblematic case.

6. Conflicts with minorities:

- The Basque Country.

- Corsica.

- Kosovo.

- The Kurds.

- The Berbers.

- Unproclaimed exodus of christians from the East: Jerusalem, Egypt, etc.

7. Use of Islam for political ends: provocation of conflict with armed groups in:

- Algeria.

- Egypt.

- Lybia.

- Palestine.

- Syria (an agreement has been reached).

Within the typing established by Paul Balta, we intend to set up a further category within the group of recent conflicts, a third group of conflicts, or, more precisely, of reasons behind conflicts:

8. Internal confrontations between authoritarian governments and defenders of human rights.

9. Economic imbalance between north and south.

10. Migratory flow to the north (seen by the north as a threat: associated xenophobia).

11. Control of water (has already happened on the Golan Heights).

12. Dependency of the north on energy: hydrocarbons and pipelines.

13. Strategic Europe-U.S.A. rivalry in the Mediterranean (NATO southern command).

Some of the conflicts are purely Mediterranean: 1. The Arab-Israeli conflict, 2. The ex-Yugoslavian conflicts, 7. The political use of Islam (although this has also occurred in other regions) and 13. The strategic Europe-U.S.A. rivalry.

Others dependent on Mediterranean conditions could occur in other places with the same natural resource characteristics: 11. Control of water (already occurred on the Golan Heights) and 12. Dependency of the north on energy: hydrocarbons and pipelines.

Others are shared with other areas of north-south contact (such as Mexico-U.S.A.): 9. North-south conflict and 10. Migratory flow.

 

4. The NGO Programme for «Mediterranean Cooperation»

We have spoken of the ecological, economic, political, population, cultural and war conditioners of the Mediterranean zone. And we have grouped these around what we presume are the three characteristics to be borne in mind in carrying out cooperation projects in the Mediterranean:

A: The proximity of the participants: in the Mediterranean the north and the south are in contact.

B: The European Union is one of the participants.

C: The Mediterranean is a rough sea.

This context outlines the principle problems in the Mediterranean. What are the problems? Although this is an oversimplification, they can be grouped in three blocks (slide 12):

1. Economic inequality: Unequal levels of development on the two shores and the associated problems (migratory flows, commercial dependence of the south, energy dependence of the north, etc.).

2. Ecological problems: The sustainability of the basin is threatened.

3. Armed conflicts.

In this setting, with these conditioners and these problems, we, the Mediterranean NGOs, must carry through our task: this is what we have to work with. Is cooperative work possible in this setting? Is it possible to implement «Mediterranean Cooperation»? We believe that cooperation in the Mediterranean is, precisely, working together to solve the common problems of the Mediterranean. This means working for a true «sustainable development» of the Mediterranean, that is to say, improvement in the quality of life of its inhabitants in a framework of sustainability and peace.

What can the Mediterranean NGOs do? And, what differences will there be compared to cooperation in other regions? All the characteristics which we have been analyzing come together in the Mediterranean and make it impossible that cooperation here be exactly the same as the cooperation for sustainable development being carried out in other parts of this planet. Normally, cooperation does not happen between neighbours (except in the analogous case of NAFTA), and usually one of the neighbours is not a giant like the European Union, nor does it usually take place in a region peppered with conflicts which often have ancient roots.

What can the NGOs do in the Mediterranean? (slide 13):

1. Promote codevelopment. The problems of the Mediterranean are common to all coastal countries, because all suffer the consequences in one form or another. «Mediterranean Cooperation» means joint work to solve those problems common to all the Mediterranean. The keyword here is «common» because we are talking about shared problems. This requires «Mediterranean Cooperation» to go much further than «aid» or «assistance» from developed to developing countries. It necessitates true codevelopment, with contributions from and benefits to both poles. From this viewpoint the Mediterranean is an ideal place to demonstrate this to us. It is true that in many cases the motives behind the desire of the developed north to initiate this cooperation are purely egoistic, they promote development in the south so as to guarantee the safety of the north, but it is still a beginning. The Mediterranean NGOs must demonstrate that codevelopment, true partnership, is possible.

2. Defend sustainable development. Encourage the disappearance of the separation between environment and development, which still exists in administrative offices and other organisations. True development is impossible unless it is sustainable and protection of the environment is impossible unless it allows the community to reach a good quality of life. This must be the guideline for the construction of a Mediterranean Free Trade Zone. From the environmental point of view the Mediterranean is a whole in which the problems are common to and shared by all. This means that the environment and its protection must be one of the principal promoters of «mediterraneanness».

3. Promote intercultural dialogue. NGOs and their networks bring into contact civil societies from different countries and traditions. Dialogue between cultures and respect for differences are constant in the daily work of the NGOs dedicated to international cooperation, who make a good example of how to build a plural and integrated Mediterranean.

4. Peace building. The above job of bringing civil societies into contact with each other is sometimes carried out in very adverse conditions, on top of which or, sometimes, on the basis of which there is conflict between the states. Among the NGOs present today there are good examples of this. Our job is the building of a lasting peace. Our great advantage is that the civil societies are not dependent on the strategic manipulations in which governments often become trapped. The NGOs are creating dialogue where the governments are not talking. We provide a reason to hope for peace.

5. Strengthen civil society, especially southern and eastern Mediterranean NGOs. If a rich civil society, with strong and regionally directed NGOs can give so many advantages, the Mediterranean NGOs must clearly aim to strengthen civil society. Unfortunately, the level of development of organisations of citizens is also very unequal. The tissue of associations in developing Mediterranean countries is often weak and the civil society is often destructured. This situation is not unconnected with the political and liberty situation of each state. Every cooperative project in the Mediterranean must have, as well as the concrete objective of its task, a parallel objective of reinforcing the capacity (capacity building) of the NGOs who are participating. Top priority requires that cooperation in the Mediterranean be used to strengthen the capacities of or build capacities in Mediterranean NGOs from the countries which need this most.

6. Democratisation. Sustainable development is impossible without participation of the population and without a rich civil society. The greatest obstacle to achieving this is the legal framework and the political measures of each state. For this reason the national NGOs as well as the regional NGO networks should put pressure on the governments to achieve legal frameworks to promote participation of the citizens and civilian associations. Authoritarian regimes are the worst possible setting for promotion of sustainable development.

7. Construct the concept of «Mediterranean Cooperation»: [We will return to this subject when we present the MED Forum programme, but let me give you a preview.] The Mediterranean NGOs are obliged to explain the differentiating characteristics of cooperation for sustainable development in our region. The first step is to reconstruct the concept of «mediteraneanness». There are more things to join us than to separate us; but nobody seems to understand this. We are the Mediterranean. We demonstrate that the Mediterranean exists and that it has something to say about how to face the challenges of human development on this planet and about how to peoples and cultures can coexist in peace. Our geographical situation is a privileged one: a point of contact between cultures and between different levels of development. «Mediterranean Cooperation» must therefore transcend its title. If we are successful the result will be a region of solidarity unique on this planet which could become a universal model of how to face the problem of developing underdeveloped countries and a solidarity based challenge to cultures to seek dialogue with each other. The Mediterranean NGOs will have to explain to their donors that when they are asking for funds to save the monk seals or to create work for the youth of the oasis, these objectives are not the only ones we have, rather we are constructing a region of solidarity unique on the planet. Once again it is necessary that humanity witness the Mediterranean make History with a capital letter.

 

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